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courts are justified in assuming that there is a difference between sections 1
and 14, it appears that the difference they have selected is one strictly picked
out of the air and based on, at best, a very disputable congressional history.
The Supreme Court acted wisely in putting a sound and just finale on a
formalistic argument and furthered the progress of anti-trust laws rather
than giving them a crippling blow as they might have done.
STEPHEN J. PARIS
Anti-Trust—Sherman Act—Price Fixing—Refusal to Deal.—Klein v.
American Luggage Works, Inc,---The plaintiff Klein, a retailer brought
this private anti-trust action2 against, American Luggage Works, a: manu-
facturer, John Wanamaker Philadelphia, Inc. and Strawbridge & Clothier,
competing retailers, for treble damages for injuries resulting from a conspiracy
in violation of the Sherman Act. 2 The conspiratorial violation was "alleged
to be a resale price maintenance scheme implemented by the sanction of the
defendant manufacturer's refusal to deal."' HELD: The manufacturer,
American, would be enjoined from refusing to supply the plaintiff pursuant to
the price fixing conspiracy and American, Wanamaker and Strawbridge were
liable in treble damages as co-conspirators.
American's policy was to show catalogues to its new and prospective
customers with suggested retail prices, and preticket each individual item of '
luggage with a tag indicating the suggested retail price. Prospective dealers
not desiring to conform to the prices were denied supply. Each dealer was
informed that compliance with the catalogue and preticketed price was
mandatory, and that non-compliance would result in termination, after an
investigation by an American representative. Klein was discounting
American Luggage for which he was repeatedly admonished by American's
salesman, who was responding to complaints from both Wanamaker and
Strawbridge sales clerks and inquiries by buyers from Wanamaker and
Strawbridge. Klein's supply was stopped one week after a visit to his store
by American's President who later refused to reinstate Klein without as-
surances that the suggested retail prices would be followed.
Against this factual background the court applied the principles found in
the Colgate and Parke Davis decisions. 5 Prior to Colgate the Supreme Court
held in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 6 that contracts by which
dealers were to sell at agreed prices were illegal under the Sherman Act. The
celebrated Colgate case followed in which, because it came to Court on the
sufficiency of the indictment, the Court stated: "And we must conclude that
as interpreted the indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with
selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not
1 Civil No. 2067 (D. Del. June 15, 1962), Trade Reg. Rep. 70,355.
2 Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, 38 (1958).
3 Id, 1: "Every contract, combination, in form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy
in restraint of trade . . . , is declared to be illegal. . . ."
4 Klein v. American Luggage Works Inc., supra note 1, p. 76,425.
5 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) ; United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
6 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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to resell except at prices fixed by the Company." The Court went on with
the statement that is the root of the Colgate doctrine:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to se11.7
Immediately, United States v. Schraeder8 was before the Court and, in
reversing a lower court, the Supreme Court summarily made a clarification of
Colgate by reinjecting the notion of agreement into the doctrine.°
This was followed by the Beech-Nut 1 ° case which has been accepted as
a limitation on the Colgate doctrine." The case was prosecuted under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 12 however the Sherman Act was utilized to
show public policy in resolving what was unfair competition.' 3 In speaking of
the previously mentioned decisions, the Court stated:
By these decisions it is settled that in prosecutions under the Sher-
man Act a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply
refuses to sell to others, and he may withhold his goods from those
who will not sell them at the prices which he fixes for their resale. He
may not, . . . go beyond the exercise of this right and by contracts
or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct
the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of interstate
trade. 14
The Court found ". . that the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond the
simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices,
which in the Colgate case was held to be within the legal right of the
producer."'° But more importantly it stated: "The specific facts found
show suppression of the freedom of competition by methods in which the
company secures the cooperation of its distributors and customers, which are
7 United States v. Colgate & Co., supra note 5, at 307.
United States v. Schraeder's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
fl The Court stated, id. at 99:
It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the obvious difference between the situation
presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices
and declines further dealings with all who fail to observe them, and one where
he enters into agreements—whether express or implied from a course of dealing
or other circumstances—with all customers. . . .
10 FTC v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
11 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 5, at 42; Report of the
Att'y Gen's Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws at 134 (1955) ; Hanson, Maintain-
ing Resale Price Through Refusals to Deal: A Re-examination, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 47, 51 (1960).
12 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
43 The Beech Nut Co. had a reporting system for policing price cutters who were
placed on a "do not sell" list and who could only get back into good graces by giving
assurances of obedience to suggested prices. Also involved was a system of marking so
that those doing the policing could determine which distributor or wholesaler was
supplying the price cutters.
14 257 U.S. at 452.
la Id. at 454.
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quite as effective as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish
the same purpose."'° Thus the Court held that competition was suppressed
and that the conduct of the company constituted a contract or contracts
whereby resale prices were maintained.
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co." the Court found a
price maintenance conspiracy where Softlite, a Bausch & Lomb distributor,
had published price lists, licensed retailers, numbered certificates for tracing
the product, price uniformity and a policy whereby wholesalers would be
removed if they did business with unlicensed retailers.
Finally, the Supreme Court summed up all these cases with the last and
limiting word on the Colgate doctrine in Parke Davis:
The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress
competition. True there results the same economic effect as is ac-
complished by a prohibited combination to suppress price competi-
tion if each customer, although induced to do so solely by a man-
ufacturer's announced policy, independently decides to observe
specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not overruled, this
result is tolerated, but only when it is in the consequence of a mere
refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer's right 'freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal! When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond
mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and
he employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices,
this countervailing consideration is not present and therefore he has
put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. 18
(Emphasis added.)
When compared with the pricing policy and the activities of the
manufacturers in Parke Davis and its predecessors, it is readily apparent
that American was not in the same "league," not only because of the size
of its operation but because of the methods employed and the fact that there
was no intermediate wholesaler or distributor involved. Therefore, at first
glance, it might seem that this court has gone too far and has been overly
strict in applying the principles of Parke Davis to the facts. But that
would avoid the. obvious, for the court simply took the Supreme Court's
language at face value, that all that would be allowed is a manufacturer's
IL
. . . mere refusal to sell . . ." and if he uses ". . other means which effect
adherence to his resale prices . . . he has put together a combination.
Fortunately, the court did not confine the rules laid down in Parke Davis
to the same type of fact situation found in that case, i.e., a manufacturer-
wholesaler—retailer relationship, as it easily could have.
Although American did not maintain a do-not-sell list, or an active and
continuing espionage method to police its scheme, the court relied strongly on
16 Id. at 455.
17
 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
18 Supra note 5, at 44.
19
 The Parke, Davis Co. had an active program to maintain its prices. It solicited
the aid of its distributors and encouraged them not to sell to price cutting retailers. The
retailers themselves were sought out and advised of the policy. Assurances of price
maintenance were sought and received from the retailers.
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the repeated admonishments of the manufacturer's salesman, the complaints
of the plaintiffs and its being cut off with refusal to reinstate without as-
surances of agreement. The court felt that any affirmative conduct beyond
mere refusal and announcement induces concerted action among retailers,
and thus the organization of a price maintenance conspiracy. 2°
The compelling motive for strictness is that resale price maintenance
.as was originally allowed by Colgate is precisely what is forbidden by Section
1 of the Sherman Act, except when operating under the various state fair trade
laws as sanctioned by the Miller Tydings21 and McGuire Acts.22
This court, as did the Supreme Court, recognized this contradiction and
has indicated that it must be kept within the narrowest of bounds. Bounds
so narrow that in a practical business situation, resale price maintenance
founded on refusals to deal might not exist at al1. 23 It would seem that to
have a "refusal to deal" policy maintain prices effectively, more than an-
nouncement and refusal would be required, which is under Parke Davis a
violation of the Sherman Act.24
It is submitted that the limitation that the Supreme Court put on the
Colgate doctrine has been properly interpreted and applied, perhaps
strengthened by a realization that inasmuch as price maintenance is contra
to Congressional policy, such policy should take precedence over the manu-
facturer's right to refuse to deal. 25
20 Klein v. American Luggage Works Inc., supra note 1, p. 76,434:
This conclusion of illegality obtains because the manufacturer's resort to means
beyond a prior announcement of terms sanctioned by a refusal to deal creates
coercive pressures which are deemed as a matter of law to induce concert of
action among adherent customers.
2i 50 Stat. 693 (1927), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
22 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
23 The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 166 (1960):
It is clear that a seller may not threaten to stop supplying any wholesaler who
sells to price cutting retailers and he probably may not discuss with his customers
their prospective policies. But in theory he may still announce a suggested price
schedule and stop dealing with those who violate it. Nevertheless, it seems
realistic to conclude that resale price maintenance cannot successfully be ac-
complished without exceeding the very strict limitations imposed on the Colgate
doctrine.
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847,
856 (1955):
Apart from statutory resale price maintenance, any systematic refusal to sell to
dealers, who do not maintain suggested resale prices, which is made known to
the trade would inevitably raise serious questions under the antitrust laws . .
See Note, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 1299, 1307 (1960).
24 Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960):
The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer
may pass, even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as
to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprises.
"Facts of Doric simplicity" were found in one case where a manufacturer cut off a
retailer who was suing for treble damages under the Clayton Act. House of Materials
Inc, v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F,2d 867 (2d Cir, 1962).
25 The court's opinion comes quite close to a suggestion made in a recent article.
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 689 (1962):
If a manufacturer induces acquiesence by his distributors in a policy of resale
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The court is in effect saying that a manufacturer may refuse to deal but
this refusal cannot be the method to gain adherence to a resale price scheme
because the coercive nature of refusal brings about concert of action.
It was also determined that a price maintenance conspiracy even though
induced by refusals to deal imposes liability on the manufacturer and
retailers, "... who adhered to specified prices with knowledge of the concerted
nature of the scheme."2° The court, however, was forced to admit: "while
the validity of this proposition is not altogether free from doubt, the court
is of the opinion that it is a correct statement of the law."27 Liability thus
attaches to all engaged in the conspiracy including the retailers.
The court relied on three cases, Interstate Circuit, Masonite and U.S.
Gypsum,28 to extend the Parke Davis rationale. In effect the court restated
Parke Davis, i.e., that agreement tacit or express is not necessary and that
securing adherence to a scheme of maintenance constitutes a combination or
conspiracy 2° Because it was a "first," the court was constrained to completely
develop its reasoning, and cited U.S. Gypsum for the principles contained in
the three cases:
. . . One of the things .	 (Masonite and Interstate Circuit) .. .
establish is the principle that when a group of competitors enter
into a series of separate but similar agreements with competitors or
others a strong inference arises that such agreements are the result
of concerted action. That inference is strengthened when con-
temporaneous declarations indicate that supposedly separate actions
are part of a common plan. . . . 8°
Even though the Supreme Court has never ruled on this point, the
decision should surprise no one. Perhaps it will be revisited or re-examined
and be dubbed as a "trap," but the reasoning and the result that follows is
quite proper on the present facts. 31
Any remaining hope that, even with Parke Davis, resale price main-
tenance by refusal to deal might continue to be effective will certainly be
dimmed by this decision.32
 It is submitted this is a fair following of the law
and the policy laid down in Parke Davis. The policy and the purpose of the
Sherman Act will no longer be frustrated by what might be described as
price maintenance, he has created a series of tacit vertical agreements, and it
seems wholly irrelevant to that conclusion that he obtained these tacit agreements
by threats of refusal to deal, carried out against those who refused to acquiesce....
26
 Klein v. American Luggage Works Inc., supra note 1, p. 76,434.
27 Ibid.
29 Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) ; United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. United States Gypsum,
333 U.S. 364 (1948). See also, Rahal, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev.
743, 759 n.59 (1950).
29
 Supra note 5, at 43-44.
30 Klein v. American Luggage Work Inc., supra note 1, p. 76,434.
81 Id., p. 76,437 (Even though no express agreement between American and the
retailers exists) "The court finds, however, that tacit understandings of crucial import
between each defendant retailer on the one hand, and the manufacturer on the other,
arose from the continued course of dealing between the parties."
32 Hanson, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., supra note I1, at 54.
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a quirk in the anti-trust laws. It is suggested that a manufacturer wishing
to have price maintenance should do so by the safe method under state
fair trade laws.
JOSEPH L. COTTER
Constitutional Law—Ability of Domicile State to Tax Railway Rolling
Stock.—Central Ry. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania'—Appellant is a Penn-
sylvania corporation licensed to operate a railroad only in Pennsylvania. It
owned 3,074 freight cars, upon which Pennsylvania had imposed an ad
valorem property tax. 2 Appellant, in protesting the tax, claimed that during
the tax year a daily average of more than 1,659 cars were entirely out-
side of Pennsylvania 3 and that 1,056 cars were used on lines which were
only partly in Pennsylvania, but was unable to show in which partic-
ular states the cars were Appellant argued that the imposition of an
unapportioned property tax on the property wholly or partly outside
the taxing jurisdiction was violative of the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution and the due process provisions of the Federal and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. On appeal from the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania ruled that property which was not shown to have had an
actual taxable situs elsewhere was subject to the taxing power of the
domiciliary state.5 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
HELD: Absent any showing of the freight cars' regular routes through or
habitual presence in particular non-domiciliary states, the domiciliary state
may tax the personal property in full.
1 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
2 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 72 § 1871 (1936) ; "Every Domestic corporation .. . shall be
subject to ... a tax at the rate of five mills upon each dollar of the actual value of its
whole capital stock of all kinds , „" Ibid. § 1901. "It shall be the duty of every corpora-
tion having capital stock ... to make annually ... a report ... setting forth . . , .
First. The amount of its capital stock at the close of the year for which report is made,
together with the highest selling price per share, and the average selling price thereof
during said year.
Fifth. Its real estate and tangible personal property, if any, owned and permanently
located outside of the Commonwealth, and value of the same; and the value of the
property, if any, exempt from taxation."
While the tax would seem more akin to a capital stock tax, the Court's consideration is
bound by the Pennsylvania Court's construction, Commonwealth v. Union Shipbuilding
Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 AtI, 257 (1921), of its being the equivalent of a property tax. N.Y.
Central Ry. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 595 (1906).
3 Pursuant to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(4)(10)(12) (1958), appellant had entered into an agreement
whereby its cars could be used by various other lines on a per diem rental basis. Appel-
lant was in somewhat of an awkward position, as it did not know exactly where the
individual cars had been; only that a particular out-of-state line had used them for a
designated number of rental days.
4 Appellant claimed that that stock which had been used by lines having a portion
of their trackage in Pennsylvania should be taxed by Pennsylvania in the same propor-
tion as the trackage in that state bears to the total trackage.
5 403 Pa. 419, 169 A.2d 878 (1961).
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